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AN UNAPOLOGETIC DEFENSE OF THE CLASSICAL 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR 
SHERRY 
Richard A. Epstein∗ 
Professor Suzanna Sherry’s spirited, if misguided, review of my 
book, The Classical Liberal Constitution, gets off on the wrong foot 
with its title: Property is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional 
Revolution.1  Her choice of title is intended to telegraph her central 
thesis that it is dangerous to afford to private property and economic 
liberties the same level of protection that the law today affords to what 
she calls “non-economic or personal rights” on such hot-button issues 
as contraception, abortion, and gay rights.2  In her view, my cardinal 
sin is taking the view that “economic and personal rights are equiva-
lent.”3  That statement is a good first approximation of my basic con-
stitutional views, but is subject to qualifications that stem from the 
historical arc of constitutional interpretation.  But for her these re-
finements do not soften her conclusion that any effort to create a pari-
ty of entitlement represents the unwise repudiation of all modern con-
stitutional thinking, which accepts the two-tiered structure of 
economic and personal rights that requires higher levels of scrutiny on 
the latter than on the former. 
Unfortunately, her thesis gets everything upside down.  Textually, 
the Constitution does not contain a single explicit reference to the term 
privacy, but does offer broad and specific protections to private  
property through the Takings Clause (“nor shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation” 4) and through the 
Due Processes Clauses of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments 
(providing that neither the federal government nor the states may de-
prive any person of “life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law”5).  Note that the last two clauses also offer explicit protection to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and the James Parker Hall Distinguished 
Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago Law School.  
My thanks to Samuel Issacharoff and Michael McConnell for their insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper, and to Rachel Bukberg and Krista Perry, The University of Chicago 
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 1 Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1452 (2015). 
 2 Id. at 1452.   
 3 Id.  
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 5 Id.; id. amend. XIV. 
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individual liberty, as does the First Amendment when it protects the 
freedoms of speech and the press and the free exercise of religion.  And 
all this is topped off with the protection for all citizens of privileges 
and immunities in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is a fair 
question to ask what becomes of constitutional law in the hands of a 
result-oriented critic who bandies about terms not found in the Consti-
tution in order to take issue with someone who tries to make sense of 
the terms that are, indubitably, found in the Constitution. 
It is the height of constitutional folly to speculate on an improvised 
unwritten constitution that has no textual warrant at all.  Sherry’s  
upside-down view of constitutional interpretation on individual rights 
ironically explains her panicky subtitle about some pending constitu-
tional revolution.  The subtitle gives voice to her fears that I may be in 
a vanguard of scholars and Supreme Court Justices who are working 
to roll back the clock on matters of economic liberties and private 
property to before the judicially wrought constitutional revolution of 
1937.  I hasten to add (although she does not raise the point) that this 
worldview most emphatically does not include any defense of the la 
mentably statist Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which, 
in stark violation of classical liberal principles, was used to uphold 
antimiscegenation laws as well as state-segregated schools and com-
mon carriers.  To be sure, the 1937 constitutional revolution involved 
not only matters of economic liberties and property rights but also is-
sues of federalism.  Yet as Professor Sherry does not address these is-
sues in her review, I shall largely ignore them as well.7 
Instead, in my response, I undertake three interrelated tasks.  The 
first is to make clear my own view on these substantive issues, and the 
second is to critique the alternative vision that Sherry tries to advance.  
The third is to call attention to the inability of progressive constitu-
tionalists like Sherry to develop an alternative theory of their own — 
an inability Sherry herself acknowledges.  At the outset, let me flag a 
point that I shall elaborate on later.  As a matter of first principle I do 
take the position that a unified conceptual framework should apply to 
what are called economic and personal liberties, even if it were possi-
ble to articulate some hard-edged separation between them.  The ana-
lytical origin of this position is that voluntary contracting, whether for 
the transfer of goods and services or the formation of long-term associ-
ations, works as well in the one domain as in the other.  In each case, 
there are gains from trade among the parties that the law should seek 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 7 She does, however, refer to Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 
(2014), as offering a refutation of my views on this issue, most notably in Richard A. Epstein, The 
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987).  I shall not address any ele-
ments of Professor Primus’s highly debatable theory here. 
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to preserve.  In each case, there is a risk that the transactions will be 
upset by problems of duress, fraud, or incompetence.  In each case, 
there are dangers that the activities of the group members will impose 
some serious risk of loss on nonmembers from either the use of force, 
fraud, or the creation of monopoly power, all of which are fair targets 
of government action under a principled classical liberal constitution.  
Although the classical common lawyers thought in terms of justice,  
the basic outlines of their system correspond well to the dictates of 
economic efficiency that have gained such influence in the past half 
century.8 
From these observations, two key points follow.  First, to the extent 
that many key constitutional provisions start from classical liberal 
premises, the good news is that on most issues there is no yawning gulf 
between the normative positions found in The Classical Liberal Consti-
tution and the explicit requirements of constitutional interpretation, 
many of which have survived and prospered through intelligent judi-
cial interpretation.  Just this state of affairs is found, by and large, 
with the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech9 and the 
judicial gloss on the dormant commerce clause.10  Second, it is clear 
that the defense that I have offered illustrates the tight link between 
the traditional natural law theory of the Framers and the modern 
views of social welfare theory that I believe offer the best analytical 
foundation for the traditional constitutional structure.  Although there 
is no room here to develop the point at large, I do believe that the gen-
eral measures of social welfare found (for all their differences) in both 
the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks formulations show how traditional natu-
ral law conceptions naturally lead into modern social welfare theory.11 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See, for instance, the famous formulation of Judge Posner: “The common law method is to 
allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to max-
imize the joint value . . . of the activities.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 98 (1st ed. 1973). 
 9 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 383–461 (2014).  One 
notable exception is much of the recent tangle on campaign finance law, which is often justified 
on explicit progressive principles:  
More than a century ago the “sober-minded Elihu Root” advocated legislation that 
would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent “the great ag-
gregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,” to elect 
legislators who would “vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests 
as against those of the public.”   
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (quoting United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 571 
(1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 227–44. 
 11 See, for an earlier account, Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural 
Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713 (1989).  For a recent explication of this position, see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Levitt Lecture: From Natural Law to Social Welfare: Theoretical Principles and 
Practical Applications, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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Yet, as I shall explain later, although the overlap between classical 
liberal theory and the U.S. Constitution is strong, it is far from perfect.  
In particular there are two problems to face.  As a creature of political 
compromise, the U.S. Constitution offers greater scope for state regula-
tion on matters of morals — chiefly sex and gambling — than a rigor-
ous classical liberal theory would involve.  Second, on a wide range of 
issues, dealing with both constitutional structures and individual 
rights, it is necessary to confront the difficult institutional challenge of 
dealing with past errors in constitutional interpretation that have 
worked themselves into the fabric of the law.  Pure normative theory 
does not have to deal with these awkward questions of transition, but 
any institutionally grounded theory is required to do so.  On this issue, 
Sherry chides me for being inconsistent and, worse, for “blinking” in 
an implied recognition of the moral strength of the opposition.12  Thus 
she notes that I do acknowledge a place for nonoriginalist reasoning 
when I ask whether “the original version of the Constitution or its 
subsequent interpretation do a better job in advancing the ideas of a 
classical liberal constitution.”13  Indeed, she does not quarrel with the 
method, which she acknowledges “is a step forward from the usual 
claims of originalists and textualists that outcomes should not mat-
ter,”14 only to chide me for my substantive positions, to which she 
admits that she does not supply a consistent and complete alternative.  
But it is wrong to think that wrestling with this difficulty is a sign of 
intellectual weakness.  To the contrary, it is a necessary part of any 
constitutional theory of interpretation, including those that rely on 
some undifferentiated notion of the “living constitution,” which magi-
cally always seems to favor progressive views that are never fully de-
fended.  The conclusion here is I think clear.  The Classical Liberal 
Constitution tries candidly to deal with these conflicting threads.  Yet, 
as Professor Sherry acknowledges in the last third of her review,15 her 
upside-down vision of constitutionalism has yet to receive a definitive 
exposition that she herself is willing to sign on to.  No wonder: no the-
ory, no principled opposition. 
In order to deal with this full range of issues, I shall tackle these 
matters as follows.  In Part I, I shall address the key issues of constitu-
tional interpretation as a matter of first principle.  In Part II, I shall 
add in the complications that arise in trying to reconcile the clarity of 
basic theory with the messiness of historical evolution.  In Part III, I 
shall comment briefly on the lack of a coherent progressive alternative. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1462–67. 
 13 Id. at 1454 (quoting EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 71).  
 14 Id. at 1455.  
 15 See id. at 1468–75. 
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I.  POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. 
The first task of any theory of constitutional interpretation is to 
make peace with the written constitutional text.  That task requires 
that the reader pay close attention to all nuances in ordinary language 
to see that judicial interpretation gives to constitutional terms mean-
ings that are nowhere found in ordinary language.  The most conspic-
uous version of this mistake is the massive expansion of the term 
“commerce”  in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, 
“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 16  
The effort to make commerce include agriculture, manufacture, and 
mining with that which they are normally contrasted represents the 
most audacious — if successful — effort to turn the Constitution up-
side down.  No amount of fancy nontextualism of the sort that Sherry 
embraces is sufficient to justify the brazen efforts that fortified the 
constitutional underpinning of the New Deal. 
It is equally important to note that no sound theory of constitution-
al interpretation rests exclusively on getting the right meaning to par-
ticular constitutional turns of phrase.  A huge amount depends on how 
these terms fit into a larger theory of linguistic interpretation that em-
braces constitutional text but also applies to the interpretation of lan-
guage that is found in contracts and statutes as well.  It is of course 
true that the Constitution does not contain all the terms that are need-
ed for its systematic explication.  As I argue extensively in The Classi-
cal Liberal Constitution, it is imperative that key terms be read into 
the document to make sense of what it contains.  The basic notion of 
the “police power” is so essential to constitutional explication that any 
effort to explain the document, as it relates to the protection of indi-
vidual rights, that ignores this critical element should rightly be re-
garded as dead on arrival.  But by the same token, any sensible theory 
of interpretation works better when it seeks to examine the unstated 
qualifications for the written document only after it explains the mean-
ing and purpose of the written terms. 
On this issue, Sherry’s opening gambit pays me the honor of com-
paring my approach to constitutional interpretation to that of the late 
Professor Ronald Dworkin17 when she writes: “Epstein’s constitution, 
like Dworkin’s, is constructed from substantive moral values.”18  I 
quite agree that Ronald Dworkin constructed his own moral constitu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 17 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996).  Of course, Dworkin and I endorse 
rather different substantive moral values and use different methods to identify the correct moral 
values. 
 18 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1453 (footnote omitted). 
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tion from first principles disconnected from the legal text.  But in later 
claiming that I approach “moral values based on history,”19 she ig-
nores a key difference between Dworkin and myself.  I am not con-
struing my own constitution.  I am quite happy to construe the U.S. 
Constitution as originally written and subsequently amended, warts 
and all.  Unlike Dworkin — and Sherry — I anchor my interpretation 
about constitutional meaning in both explicit textual provisions and, as 
all systems of interpretation must do, in the general political theory 
that animated those texts.  Throughout the book I offer detailed expli-
cations of its various provisions and close reading of the major  
Supreme Court cases that have charted the course of American consti-
tutional law.  Perhaps some of these treatments are wrong, but it is 
characteristic of both Sherry and other critics of the book, most nota-
bly Professor Cass Sunstein,20 to flee to higher levels of abstraction ra-
ther than point out any specific textual mistakes.  Anyone who thinks 
that either Sherry’s or Sunstein’s review gives an accurate rendition of 
my explicit modes of constitutional interpretation, all of which have 
powerful antecedents going back to both Roman and early English 
law, should read Chapter 3, “Constitutional Interpretation: The Origi-
nal and Prescriptive Constitutions,” to get some sense of the method. 
As I noted constantly in that chapter and elsewhere, some tension 
becomes inevitable when trying to piece together incomplete texts with 
contested political philosophy.  But this difficulty is not one that any 
defender of New Deal constitutionalism, like Sherry, is in a position to 
escape.  She has to go through the same exercise in order to defend her 
views of the Constitution.  In this regard, it is unresponsive to list a 
large number of distinguished historians — Professors Bernard Bailyn, 
Forrest McDonald, and Jack Rakove21 — whose views on some mat-
ters differ from mine, because they never attempt to link their intellec-
tual history to case-specific or clause-bound constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Of course, there were many differences between the Federalists 
and Antifederalists, but anyone would be hard pressed to find a single 
point of contention that could be cashed out to support the hallmark 
legislation of the New Deal.22  The major difference between the two 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Man Who Made Libertarians Wrong About the Constitution: 
How Richard Epstein’s Highly Influential, Highly Politicized Scholarship Cemented Tea Party 
Dogma, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117619/classical 
-liberal-constitution-richard-epstein-reviewed [http://perma.cc/RD56-NHS9].  Apart from this ap-
palling title, Sunstein, characteristically, wishes not to “lose the forest for the trees,” id., and thus 
ducks the discussion of all particular textual provisions or decided cases. 
 21 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1458 n.21. 
 22 Although somewhat dated, see HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 
WERE FOR (1981), for some sense of the substantive differences between the two camps, which 
were based largely on structural matters rather than their basic theories of governance. 
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camps was not over the theory of substantive rights, but whether these 
rights were better protected by national or state governments.  On this 
score, it is instructive to note that to the extent that the original Con-
stitution addressed this issue, it was through the Contracts Clause, 
which states that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . . ”23  I have long argued that the Contracts 
Clause imposes limitations on how the state could regulate not only ex-
isting contracts, but also those contracts that had not yet been made.24  
And whatever doubts that existed were largely removed by the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the correct reading of the 
Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses 
all place powerful limitation on the scope of state power to regulate 
economic and noneconomic matters alike. 
It takes no close reading of multiple historical sources to show that 
neither the Federalists nor the Antifederalists in the ratification de-
bates supported such massive federal schemes as the National Labor 
Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, or Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 insofar as it imposes an antidiscrimination law on 
employers operating in competitive markets.  On individual liberties, 
the protection of property and contract from state interference was 
very much on the minds of the Framers.  Sherry sows needless confu-
sion into the narrative by overreading some words from James Wilson: 
“Again he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary 
object of Government and society.  The cultivation and improvement 
of the human mind was the most noble object.” 25  In her view, this 
passage supports her thesis that personal rights occupy a higher plane 
than property rights.  But one swallow does not make a summer.  
There is much textual evidence that the Framers regarded personal 
and property rights as compatible, even conceptually compelled by one 
another.  James Madison’s general view, for example, was precisely 
the opposite of the one championed by Sherry: one broad conception of 
what he called property rights covered both areas.  Thus Madison 
wrote in Federalist 10 that: 
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property 
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.  
The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.  From 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
 24 See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
703, 729–37 (1984) (defending, with modification, the dissenting position of Chief Justice Marshall 
and Justice Joseph Story in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)).  For a general 
discussion of this matter, see generally THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harry N. 
Scheiber ed., 1998) (collecting essays).   
 25 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1459 (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 287 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (Friday, July 13, 1787) 
(James Wilson)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the 
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately re-
sults . . . .26 
Madison echoes the same theme in his brief 1792 essay “Property”: 
  This term in its particular application means “that dominion which 
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in ex-
clusion of every other individual.”  
  In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a 
man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one 
else the like advantage. 
  In the former sense, a man’s land, or merchandize, or money is called 
his property. 
  In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and the free 
communication of them.27 
Madison’s first sentence is lifted straight from Blackstone.28  The 
second and fourth show the extensions that he is prepared to make.  
There is no effort to break the world into separate domains of property 
and personal rights.  To the contrary, Madison well understands that 
law cannot cultivate or improve the human mind.  But law can protect 
the background institutions of liberty and property that make such 
cultivation and improvement possible.  His position is an advance re-
jection of the very position that Sherry seeks to defend. 
Sherry next casts aspersions on the common law framework that 
plays such a large role in The Classical Liberal Constitution when she 
writes: 
[A]s . . .  Cass Sunstein put it, “the common law is itself a regulatory sys-
tem, embodying a series of controversial social choices.”  Once we under-
stand that the distribution resulting from the common law is not natural 
or immutable, we can view Epstein’s preference for current distributions 
with the skepticism it deserves.29 
It is critical to identify at least some of the manifold intellectual 
confusions contained in this short passage.  First, it is a wild exaggera-
tion to say that the common law — no qualifications here — involves 
“a series of controversial social choices.”  Its core protections are that 
no one may kill or injure another person or take his property.  It is not 
credible to think that the basic law that bans murder or the forcible 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 27 James Madison, Property, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON DIGITAL EDITION 
(J.C.A. Stagg ed., 2010), http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JSMN-01-14-02-0238 [http:// 
perma.cc/C8BF-BSV9]. 
 28 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1 (“[T]hose rights which a man may 
acquire in, and to, such external things as are unconnected with his person.  These are what the 
writers on natural law [style] the rights of dominion, or property, concerning the nature . . . .”).    
 29 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1460–61 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New 
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 451 (1987)) (footnote omitted). 
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dispossession from real property is controversial.  The same is true 
with respect to the protection of land and chattels against deliberate 
destruction by other individuals.  Of course, there are difficulties in 
setting the right balance with the fine points of adverse possession, the 
reach of strict liability and negligence in a common law system, and 
the role of promissory estoppel in contracts.  But so what?  The  
Constitution does not seek to arbitrate those doctrinal disputes when it 
seeks to insulate all individuals from the depredations of government 
actions.  Does anyone really believe that the constitutional cases that 
announce that there is a per se ban against the outright confiscation of 
private property represents some highly disputed social choice?30  No 
way.  Not detail of the common law is immutable, but its basic protec-
tions are found in more or less the same form in every civilized society 
that condemns murder, rape, theft, and pillage. 
Sherry’s casual form of social relativism should be condemned as 
the dangerous diversion from the fundamental norms of social order 
that it is.  Perhaps there is some alternative constitutional framework 
on which Sherry might wish to rely, but if so it is incumbent on her to 
state what it is.  Even privacy does not quite do the job for a number 
of reasons.  First, much of the protection of privacy comes from the 
common law tort of trespass and the general law of trade secrets, so it 
is far from clear just how much of that body of law survives as a 
stand-alone structure once the basic rules of personal liberty and pri-
vate property are disregarded.  There is also little doubt that privacy 
receives constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment’s pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures as it applies to 
“persons, houses, papers and effects.” 31  That protection is extensive 
even if Boyd v. United States32 is wrong, as I believe, in trying to 
make a disembodied privacy interest central to the interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment.33  Instead, it is far easier to note that some 
searches need not involve trespasses: think of the use of a searchlight 
from a distance.  Yet these are caught by the Amendment under con-
ventional modes of interpretation.34 
Additionally, there is the simple question of proportion.  There is a 
good reason why privacy as a separate interest did not emerge in its 
modern form until the famous article by Samuel Warren and Louis D. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 See, e.g., Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 32 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 33 For a recent statement of my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Entick v. Carrington and Boyd 
v. United States: Keeping the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015). 
 34 For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699, 713–17 (1992). 
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Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, appeared in the Harvard Law Review 
in 1890.35  Most of the important work was already done by the law of 
trespass and by the rules governing confidentiality.  It is also worth 
noting that the peculiar form of privacy that Warren and Brandeis 
sought to protect — the privacy of a wedding from the prying eyes of 
reporters — has been long regarded as unconstitutional; the supposed 
right to privacy is swallowed by a broad and pervasive “newsworthi-
ness” exception.36  The bricks and mortar for a major constitutional 
revolution are just not there. 
Second, no one denies Sunstein’s well-known conceit that the 
common law is a regulatory system of sorts.  After all, the common 
law (like every other known legal system) imposes liability for torts 
and breaches of contract among many other things.  All systems are 
regulatory in this broad but imprecise sense.  The common law, how-
ever, is not a regulatory system insofar as it relies on extensive gov-
ernment administrative structures.  Instead, it involves a narrow set of 
remedies, such as damages and equitable remedies such as specific per-
formance and injunctive relief.  But integrating common law suits 
with administrative oversight has been a constant theme for nearly 
five hundred years, if not longer, as in an astute discussion of the rela-
tionship between public and private nuisance found in 1535.37  Yes, of 
course, the common law system is controversial by virtue of the simple 
fact that Professors Sunstein and Sherry choose to contest it, but nei-
ther identifies any deep and systematic flaw.  Many people believe that 
the common law flows from the natural law tradition insofar as it pro-
tects autonomous choices, enforces contract, and blocks aggression; 
none of these principles are ad hoc contrivances in speaking about 
property or privacy.38  But no serious lawyer has ever thought that the 
common law was immutable or impervious to internal development or 
legislative modification, least of all me.  What is critical is to test such 
alterations against some normative theory that explains whether and 
how these variations produce social improvements over the common 
law baseline.  The chief normative theory by which to judge this in-
volves showing how these common law rules, often defended on natu-
ral law grounds, dovetail with modern conceptions of overall social 
welfare, as noted earlier.  For example, the development of takings 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 36 See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law — Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 335–39 (1966). 
 37 Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535), reprinted in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 706 (7th ed. 2000). 
 38 Of my many articles on privacy, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: 
And Putting it Back Together Again, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (2000); and Richard A. Epstein, 
Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (2000). 
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laws for just compensation is an indispensable element for the im-
provement of overall social welfare even though eminent domain is at 
root a legislative power.39 
Nor is this intellectual heritage undermined by the broadside claim 
that laissez faire is an ad hoc invention that I bring to my interpreta-
tion of the Constitution.  Not so.  This French phase was well estab-
lished by the 1750s, and was certainly in evidence in such works as 
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and William Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries on the Law of England, which do not even make a cameo 
appearance in Sherry’s review of the intellectual history leading up to 
the Founding Period.40  There is of course no doubt that this general 
conceptual commitment did not resolve the particular issues that arose 
with the massive industrialization of the United States, particularly in 
the post–Civil War period.  But nineteenth-century judges were broad-
ly consistent in applying the classical liberal framework, with adjust-
ments appropriate to these developments, including protection for wild 
animals41 and other common pool assets such as oil and gas,42 safety 
regulation,43 rate regulation,44 and antitrust laws.45 
Sherry shows no awareness of these developments when she claims 
that my discussion of the police power ranks as “perhaps the weakest 
part of the book.”46  She then attacks my views on the “morals”  head 
of the police power,47 which I shall address later.  But most tellingly 
she offers no support for her blanket condemnation of my views in 
connection with matters of the police power for health and safety.  On 
these matters she does not offer any reason against my position that 
government regulation should not be allowed when purported police 
power regulation is just a veil for the creation and preservation of mo-
nopoly power that is inimical to overall social welfare.  The system 
that I defend does not impose any untoward limitations on the power 
of the state to engage in rate regulation and antitrust enforcement.  
Both these exercises of the police power were perhaps at the top of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).  The reference to social welfare 
theory opens the book.  See id. at 3–6. 
 40 Sherry cites in behalf of her position the very learned arguments of Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Inventing the Classical Constitution (Dec. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2486612 [http://perma.cc/XKS8-Q8S6].  See Sherry, supra note 1, at 1458–59, 1459 n.24.  
But we are as ships passing in the night, as he never goes through the case analysis by which I 
document the rise of progressivism. 
 41 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 42 See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1900). 
 43 See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
 44 See Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Rate Regulation in the United States 
Supreme Court: Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 345 (2013). 
 45 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 46 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1463. 
 47 See id. 
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Supreme Court’s agenda during the pre-1937 period, during which the 
Court gave rise to some serious challenges on such questions as what it 
meant to impose price regulation on firms “affected with a public in-
terest.”48  Yet, as I argue, none of the positions taken at that time 
could have justified the 1934 decision in Nebbia v. New York,49 which 
used a rational basis test to allow New York to criminally enforce its 
minimum milk prices in a highly competitive industry,50 and thus 
paved the way for the inexcusable system of marketing orders under 
the various Agricultural Adjustment Acts.  On these questions, Sherry 
displays a surprising indifference and acquiescence, for she just refuses 
to let the reader know whether she accepts or rejects Nebbia and its 
progeny. 
Instead, Sherry criticizes my uncompromising attitude toward col-
lective bargaining and other forms of labor market regulation.51  How 
can one not believe in these, she notes, when “[i]n the real world, high 
unemployment rates, lack of skills, prejudice, and the stickiness of ex-
isting arrangements limit employees’ options”?52  Easy: because her 
brief passage gets the causation backwards.  The reason our unem-
ployment rates are high and employment markets are sticky sits on the 
doorstep of the misguided New Deal decisions that joyously sustained 
these interferences with labor markets.53  Heavily regulated markets 
allowed even more prejudice to flourish because union leaders could 
use their political power to snuff out the rights of black employees — 
even after the Supreme Court sought, largely unsuccessfully, to limit 
the huge bargaining rights and state-conferred monopoly power that it 
gave to unions in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB54 with a duty of fair represen-
tation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.55  Many well-
intentioned legislative reforms can easily go awry. 
II.  “BLINKING” ON PERSONAL LIBERTIES 
In light of this history, I hope it is clear why I remain adamantly 
opposed to a set of legal relationships that have proved socially harm-
ful over the last seventy-five years.  Nonetheless, Sherry is right to ask 
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 48 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127 (1876); see also Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of 
Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
 49 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 50 See id. at 515, 537. 
 51 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1468–69. 
 52 Id. at 1461–62. 
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 54 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
 55 323 U.S. 192 (1944).  For a critique of the case, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 121–25 (1992). 
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why I am so uncompromising in my denunciation of these arrange-
ments, while I “blink” (to use her term) in dealing with the various 
forms of personal rights that historically were subject to the morals 
dictated by the police power.56  As she notes at the outset, I flag at 
least two deep cleavages in the theory of constitutional law.  The first 
is the tension between the general implications of a classical liberal 
theory and the particulars of constitutional text, which for these pur-
poses include the traditional and uniform construction of the police 
power — the famous quartet of “health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare.”  The morality of the police power has a decidedly and con-
sciously antilibertarian stance, which is hard to overlook or ignore, as 
it concedes to the states large regulation over marriage and sexual 
practices, and authorizes extensive “sin taxes” on gambling and other 
similar activities. 
The second deals with the key question of what should be done in 
the event of constitutional mistake — that is, where a decision seems 
in clear tension with the originalist modes of interpretation.  I chose 
the term “prescriptive constitution” to highlight the immense difficul-
ties that arise whenever long practices are in tension with the original 
constitutional design.57  After all, one of the central questions in prop-
erty law is to explain why, after some magic point, a continued tres-
pass can protect title by prescription and adverse possession.  In some 
instances, it seems clear that we should accept such practices, and 
even strict originalists should not be so foolish as to seek to undo those 
institutions that have allowed the nation to flourish.58  This is why I 
am quite explicit that for all their conceptual missteps, Marbury v. 
Madison,59 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,60 and the dormant commerce 
clause cases should stand,61 while Plessy should be struck down with-
out so much as a second thought, as was done by Brown v. Board of 
Education,62 itself an analytically highly flawed decision.63 
So the question is: why my somewhat different attitudes toward the 
two classes of rights?  As to private property and economic liberties, 
the text and the classical liberal theory are in congruence, and the 
damage to the social fabric by the combination of bad constitutional 
law and bad political theory offers good reasons to overturn these mis-
takes.  Let’s displace it root and branch, tempered only by the need to 
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 56 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1462. 
 57 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 68–71. 
 58 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1462. 
 59 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 60 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 61 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 97–100, 243–44. 
 62 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 63 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 530–35. 
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avoid massive dislocations in the effort to unseat so entrenched a sys-
tem.64  For example, the massive system of transfer payments, which 
while impossible to jettison midstream, should not have been extended 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.65 
The moral decisions start with a very different pedigree.  Sherry 
underestimates the gravity of the problem when she writes: “Once  
Epstein defines the police power to include morals . . . . ”66  Whoa!  It 
is not my definition, but rather the content of the police power that 
has been established by a consistent line of nineteenth-century deci-
sions that are, as I recognize, often inconsistent with any classical lib-
eral theory.  The morals head of the police power includes, “activities 
that were thought to be sinful, most notably sexual practices such as 
adultery, prostitution, homosexuality, abortion, and contraception.”67  
It also covered “activities like gambling, cockfighting and perhaps 
even bowling.”68 The most egregious version of the nineteenth-century 
worldview on morals is Reynolds v. United States,69 with its vicious 
attack on polygamy that conveniently resulted in massive forfeiture of 
Mormon goods to the United States.  The same argument applies to 
gay marriage, where as a matter of first principle, I am very hard 
pressed to see any justification for the state to limit the parties to 
whom it will extend a marriage license. 
In my view, the operative doctrine is that of unconstitutional con-
ditions, which identifies key cases where the state may either grant or 
withhold a privilege, but nonetheless is not allowed to grant the privi-
lege subject to conditions that some meet but others do not.  The doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions is a counterweight to the view that 
the greater power — withholding all licenses — necessarily encom-
passes the lesser power — withholding the licenses from some.  In one 
canonical formulation: “The right to absolutely exclude all right to 
use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under what cir-
cumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains 
the lesser.”70  This power of selection is a real plus in competitive 
markets where those who are kept out of the system have multiple op-
tions.  But that absolute power to refuse to deal is dangerous whenever 
there is a single supplier of goods or services, which is the unique posi-
tion that the government holds when it has the sole power to issue or 
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 64 On which, see EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 326–29. 
 65 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code).  
 66 Sherry, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 67 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 367. 
 68 Id. 
 69 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 70 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897), abrogated by Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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deny permits or licenses of any sort.  It is for just this reason that the 
duty to take all customers is imposed on common carriers and public 
utilities, which is intended to impose sharp limits on the state’s exer-
cise of its monopoly power. 
As a matter of first principle, this limitation carries over perfectly 
to permits — at least if the government’s activity is subject to the 
same level of scrutiny as that of the common carrier.  But on matters 
of morals, traditionally, the state did exercise strong monopoly powers 
over marriage, which precluded the operation of that doctrine.  So 
there is the difficult split between the normative and the constitutional 
positions.  Accordingly, there is much force, textually, in Judge  
Sutton’s recent decision in DeBoer v. Snyder,71 which stressed the in-
congruity in striking down the traditional definition of marriage as a 
union between one man and one woman (including in some places po-
lygamy), which “until recently had been adopted by all governments 
and major religions of the world.”72  Indeed, historically there is not 
one shred of evidence that the parties who drafted either the 1787 
Constitution, the 1791 Bill of Rights, or the 1868 Fourteenth Amend-
ment wished in the slightest to curb the state’s power to criminalize 
homosexual relationships, along with all sorts of other sexual behavior.  
So there is a real tension between these two areas that is not found 
with economic liberties.  I do not “blink” in the sense that I am wob-
bly on the basic conceptual framework.  I simply point out that it is a 
lot easier to reach a decision of constitutional dimensions when both of 
the basic indicators — doctrine and theory — point in the same direc-
tion than when they point in opposite directions. 
Finally, we all blink in some cases.  The Justices who decided 
Brown fretted a lot more about the legitimacy of their decision than do 
its modern defenders so many years later.  Indeed, Sherry should take 
some comfort in my views on race relations.  After all it is easier to 
sustain affirmative action programs without having to contend with 
the strict color-blind rule, so applicable to imposition of criminal pun-
ishment.  Instead, as I urge, when the government is engaged in essen-
tial management functions it should normally have the benefit of the 
business judgment rule.  In our second-best world, the state role in ed-
ucation has grown far too great, so now local governments must figure 
out in difficult circumstances whether, and if so how, to implement an 
affirmative action educational program.73  Sherry does not, however, 
disaggregate various government functions in stating her opposition to 
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 71 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 72 Id. at 396. 
 73 EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 535–36. 
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the central thesis of the book, and thus misses all the difficult dynam-
ics of the situation. 
III.  THE FAILURE OF MODERN THEORY 
Once Professor Sherry has finished her attack on my position, she 
turns her attention to the challenging task of articulating an alterna-
tive constitutional position.  In this regard, her most telling weakness 
is her failure to anchor the modern progressive regime in any textual, 
structural, or functional examination of the constitutional text.  To her 
great credit, the last third of her review chides her liberal friends for 
their failure to develop a comprehensive vision that takes into account 
both the basic constitutional structure and its many historical twists 
and turns.74  Ironically, she is unhappy with their efforts for the same 
reason I am unhappy with the utter lack of any reasoned defense of 
her position in her review.  Sherry and the writers she criticizes — a 
distinguished list that in different ways includes Professors Edwin 
Baker, Walter Dellinger, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Fallon, Larry 
Kramer, and Laurence Tribe — are both unsystematic and unpersua-
sive in their defense of the modern two-tier synthesis that subordinates 
private property and economic liberty to personal liberties.  What 
Sherry should have concluded is that in spite of their efforts, her  
upside-down thesis is ultimately indefensible. 
There is a deep lesson here.  One sign of intellectual wisdom in the 
academic business is not to pretend that matters are simple when most 
assuredly they are not.  But by the same token, it is critical in examin-
ing economic liberties and property rights, not to introduce unneces-
sary complications in areas that are in fact amenable to simple solu-
tions in this all too complex world.  So on the matter of first principle, 
I revert back to one of my favorite passages in political theory from 
The Edinburgh Review of 1843: “Be assured that freedom of trade, 
freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of action, are but 
modifications of one great fundamental truth, and that all must be 
maintained or all risked: they stand or fall together.”75  Excellent po-
litical theory, and excellent constitutional law.  
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 75 Article VII, 77 EDINBURGH REV. 190, 224 (1843). 
